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Abstract 
 
We exploit a regression kink design to estimate the elasticity of the duration of sickness absence 
with respect to the replacement rate. The elasticity is a central parameter in defining the optimal 
social insurance scheme compensating for lost earnings due to sickness. We use comprehensive 
administrative data and a kink in the policy rule near the median earnings. We find a statistically 
significant estimate of the elasticity on the order of one.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Absenteeism leads to sizeable losses of working time worldwide. In some OECD countries, nearly 
10% of annual working days are lost because of sickness absence (DICE Database, 2017; see Treble 
& Barmby, 2011). The costs of absenteeism are considerable for individuals themselves, employers, 
co-workers, and health and benefit systems. A sickness insurance system is designed to protect 
individuals from earnings losses. Among cash benefits, sickness insurance is one of the most 
important social protection schemes in Europe (Eurostat, 2017). The key policy parameter of the 
system is the replacement rate, i.e., the ratio of sickness insurance benefits to past earnings. 
 
We examine the effect of the replacement rate of the Finnish sickness insurance on the duration of 
sickness absence. We find a substantial and robust behavioral response in a universal insurance 
scheme. The statistically significant point estimate of the elasticity of the duration of sickness 
absence with respect to the replacement rate is centered around one. The elasticity refers to the 
intensive margin, i.e., the incentive effect conditional on being sick. The point estimate is lower 
when we exclude long spells. 
 
The elasticity of the duration of sickness absence is a vital parameter of an optimal sickness 
insurance system, because the replacement rate affects workers’ financial incentives to be absent 
from work through a moral hazard or hidden action effect. In the absence of externalities, an 
optimal social insurance system balances the marginal costs of more generous payments to the sick, 
with the welfare gain resulting from the consumption smoothing that the benefits allow, captured in 
the Baily–Chetty formula (Baily, 1978; Chetty, 2006; Pichler & Ziebarth, 2017). 
 
We use a Regression Kink Design (RKD, see Section 3) to identify the causal effect of the 
replacement rate. The method is similar to Regression Discontinuity Design, where one exploits 
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level jumps in policy rules, but in the RKD the slope of the policy rule changes and we analyze 
whether the slope of the behavioral response changes as well. Unlike in most other countries (Frick 
& Malo, 2008, pp. 510-511), the compensation of sickness insurance in Finland is not a fixed 
fraction of past earnings. Instead, the policy rule follows a piecewise linear scheme with a 
replacement rate that decreases with earnings. The institutional setting allows us to use RKD, in 
which the identification of the effect is based on a pre-determined, nonlinear benefit function 
(Nielsen et al., 2010; Card et al., 2012).  
 
Previous research has used policy reforms that provide exogenous variation in the replacement rates 
to study the effect of sick pay level on absence. Several studies exploit legislative changes in the 
replacement rates and provide difference-in-difference estimates for Sweden (Henrekson & 
Persson, 2004; Johansson & Palme, 2005; Pettersson-Lidbom & Skogman Thoursie, 2013). There is 
also relevant evidence for other countries (Puhani & Sonderhof, 2010; De Paola et al., 2014; Fevang 
et al., 2014; Ziebarth & Karlsson, 2014). Most other countries, including the U.S., have more 
fragmented sickness insurance schemes which complicates the analysis (cf. Gruber, 2000). In 
addition to studies that have exploited policy reforms within countries, there is cross-country 
evidence on the effect of the replacement rate of sickness insurance on absenteeism (Frick & Malo, 
2008).  
 
Evidence shows that the response of absence to the replacement rate is positive but the quantitative 
size of the effect varies substantially from study to study. However, the comparison of the estimates 
is not straightforward, since the outcome variables (duration of sickness absence or the number of 
sickness absence days) and methods are not identical. The elasticity we find using RKD is towards 
the higher end of estimates in the literature. 
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Empirical studies based on policy reforms offer a different setup from ours. Reforms are aimed at 
specific groups, the causal impact takes time to take effect, agents anticipate the upcoming reform, 
and effects are confounded by simultaneous policy changes or other shocks (cf. Besley & Case, 
2000; Pettersson-Lidbom & Skogman Thoursie, 2013, p. 487). The main downside in a valid RKD 
setting is that the estimate is local around the kink point(s). We discuss the key challenges in our 
robustness checks. 
 
Our study improves upon previous literature by using a method that allows us to focus on all 
employees around the kink point in the benefit rule. The kink point provides policy-relevant 
exogenous variation in the neighborhood of the median earnings (see Section 2). A long-standing 
quasi-experiment is also likely to reveal equilibrium behavior.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the institutional setting. 
Section 3 describes RKD. Section 4 introduces the data. Section 5 presents the estimation results. 
The last section concludes.  
 
2. THE FINNISH SICKNESS INSURANCE SYSTEM 
 
Finland, like the other Nordic countries, has a universal mandatory sickness insurance scheme. It 
covers all 16–67 years old permanent residents (Toivonen, 2012; Kangas et al., 2013). Although 
admissible by law, there is no private sickness insurance market in Finland. The sickness insurance 
scheme guarantees compensation for the loss of earnings owing to sickness and illness. Sickness 
allowances and reimbursements are defined in the Health Insurance Act and Decree. The Social 
Insurance Institution of Finland (KELA) pays out a Sickness Allowance (SA) as compensation for 
the loss of earnings caused by an illness or injury. Sickness insurance is financed by both employers 
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and employees. Insurance contributions are proportional to earnings and unrelated to the benefit 
rule. The state participates by financing a minimum allowance that is paid to those with no earnings. 
 
Before receiving the SA from KELA, the person must complete a waiting period, which includes 
the day of onset of work incapacity and the following nine working days. The waiting period 
includes Saturdays but not Sundays or public holidays. The incapacity for work must be certified by 
a doctor, and the employer is obliged to notify KELA of the sickness leave. The employee is 
entitled to the normal full salary during the nine-day waiting period if the employment relationship 
has lasted for at least a month.1 Thus, the incentive effects related to the payment scheme are only 
relevant for periods longer than nine days. 
 
After the nine-day waiting period the employee is eligible to receive an earnings-related SA from 
KELA. The maximum period for SA is 300 working days (i.e. approximately a full calendar year). 
All SA days within the last two years are counted towards this sum. After the maximum has been 
reached, there is an assessment of eligibility for a disability pension. The person is eligible to 
receive the SA again only after having worked for at least a year. 
 
Using the Quality of Work Life Survey by Statistics Finland (Lehto & Sutela, 2009), we have 
calculated that the proportion of long-term sickness spells (over 10 days) is 15%. Given the average 
length of 44 days for long spells (see Section 4), and assuming an average length of 5 days for short 
spells, the share of sickness days for long spells is approximately 60%. The policy relevance of 
long-term sickness absence spells is timely since they may eventually lead to a permanent 
                                                 
1 If the employment has lasted less than a month, the beneficiary receives 50% of the salary. KELA 
fully compensates employers for these payments.  
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withdrawal from the labor market in the form of disability pension (Autor & Duggan, 2003; 
Kivimäki et al., 2004).  
 
The earnings-related SA has no ceiling. This feature distinguishes the Finnish scheme from those of 
the other Nordic countries and most other European sickness insurance systems. In 2012, for annual 
earnings of up to 34,496 euro, the marginal replacement rate was 70%, after which it decreased to 
40% and at 53,072 euro to 25%.  
 
For our purposes, the most important feature of the system is that the replacement rate of the 
earnings-related SA follows a pre-determined, nonlinear policy rule. First, the SA is determined by 
past taxable annual earnings validated by tax authorities. The relevant earnings are those earned two 
calendar years before the claim for sickness insurance is made. For example, in 2012, the SA was 
calculated based on taxable earnings in 2010.2 Work-related expenses are deducted from taxable 
earnings, and an additional deduction is made to account for pension and unemployment insurance 
contributions.  
 
The second crucial feature of the system is that the benefit formula follows a piecewise linear policy 
rule in past earnings. These kinks in the system were created in the early 1980s (Kangas et al., 2013, 
p. 283). The determination of SA for 2012 is illustrated in Figure 1. There are four earnings 
brackets. The benefit formula for the earnings-related SA exhibits one discontinuity and two kink 
                                                 
2 The amount of taxable earnings is based on the decision by the Finnish Tax Administration. An 
index is used to account for a subsequent rise in wage and salary earners’ earnings (80 percent 
weight) and the cost of living index (20 percent weight). In 2013 the ratio of sickness allowance 
benefits to wages and salaries was 1.0 percent; see Social Insurance Institution (2014) and Statistics 
Finland: Annual National Accounts.    
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points, which we define as the lower and upper kink points. Both kink points allow one to use RKD 
to identify the causal effect of the replacement rate. The discontinuity point cannot be exploited, 
since those below the threshold receive no compensation and are thus not in the data. The 
replacement rates are illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 here 
 
The lower kink point follows the median earnings very closely throughout the period (Böckerman et 
al., 2018, Figures A1–A2 and Table A1). The response estimated around the lower kink point is 
likely to be similar for a large proportion of the population and thus relevant for policy purposes. 
The upper kink point is set at a high level (near the 9th decile point of the earnings distribution). 
 
3. REGRESSION KINK DESIGN 
 
3.1. Identification 
 
Card et al. (2012) propose the Regression Kink Design (RKD), which uses a kink or kinks in a 
policy rule to identify the causal effect of the policy rule on the outcome variable of interest. 
Intuitively, RKD could be characterized as similar to Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), with 
the difference that instead of level changes, RKD exploits exogenous changes in the slopes of a 
policy rule. 
 
A valid RKD setting requires the explanatory variable (in our case, the replacement level) to be a 
deterministic and known function of an assignment variable (in our case, earnings from two years 
prior). The function also must have at least one kink point. This means that the function has 
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segments where it is (continuous and) differentiable, but in at least one point, it is continuous but 
non-differentiable, having unequal left and right derivatives (Condition 1).  
 
The second condition for a valid RKD setting is that the density of the assignment variable is 
smooth (Condition 2). Endogenous bunching of observations near kink points (i.e., discontinuities 
in the derivative of the density function) or non-smoothness of covariates would invalidate this 
condition (see Card et al., 2012 for these testable predictions). Additionally, regularity conditions 
are needed for a valid RKD. 
 
In our setup, Condition 1 holds, since we know exactly how earnings from two years prior 
determine the replacement level. We also have data on the relevant earnings and the replacement 
level. Also, as Figure 1 shows, the relationship between the assignment variable and the policy 
variable for the year 2012 is continuous for earnings above 1325 euro and has kinks at 34,496 and 
53,072 euro. Other years in the data reveal a similar structure. 
 
Condition 2 is not directly verifiable in empirical applications. However, it is unlikely that 
individuals manipulate the benefit level by altering their earnings in order to be assigned to another 
segment of the benefit function two years later. We can also ascertain that other benefit rules, such 
as the earnings-related unemployment benefit, do not have kinks or discontinuities at the same 
points as the sickness benefit, and thus, they do not affect the assignment. Furthermore, we can test 
for whether the distribution of the control variables is smooth in relation to the kink point. If we 
find this not to be the case, Condition 2 fails, which invalidates the design. This procedure is very 
similar to what is usually done to validate RDD (for a review, see Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). 
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3.2. Formal model 
 
Here we show formally the identification of the causal effect of the replacement rate on sickness 
spell length by exploiting the kink in the benefit scheme. Intuitively, the effect is calculated as the 
ratio of the change in the slope of the outcome variable (sickness spell length) and the exogenous 
change in the slope of the policy rule (marginal replacement rate). 
 
Let Si be sickness days in year t, for individual 𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝑛}. Yi is earnings in the year 𝑡 − 2 and 
Bi is the sickness allowance, which follows the deterministic assignment function 𝐵௜ = 𝑏(𝑌௜), with a 
kink at 𝑌௜ = 𝑦௞. The parameter of interest is the change in the slope of the conditional expectation 
function 𝑚(𝑦) = 𝐸[𝑆௜|𝑌௜ = 𝑦], at 𝑦௞ divided by the change in the slope of the deterministic 
assignment function 𝑏(𝑦) at 𝑦 = 𝑦௞. 
 
The general model of interest is of the form: 
𝑆௜ = 𝑠(𝑌௜, 𝐵௜, 𝜀௜), 
where 𝜀௜  is an error term. 
 
Card et al. (2012) show that 𝜏, the average marginal effect of 𝑏(𝑦), is identified at 𝑦 = 𝑦௞ if 
𝑠(𝑌௜, 𝐵௜, 𝜀௜) and its derivatives with respect to 𝑌௜ and 𝐵௜ are continuous, 𝑏(𝑌௜) has a kink (Condition 
1) and the density of 𝑌௜ is smooth (Condition 2) at 𝑦௞. Under these assumptions, 𝐸(𝜀௜|𝑌௜ = 𝑦௞) is a 
smooth function and 
 
 
𝜏 =
𝐷ା𝑚(𝑦௞) −  𝐷ି𝑚(𝑦௞)
𝐷ା𝑏(𝑦௞) −  𝐷ି𝑏(𝑦௞)
, (2) 
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where 𝐷௝𝑚(𝑦௞) = lim
௬→௬ೖ
ೕ
డ௠(௬)
డ௬
, 𝐷௝𝑏(𝑦௞) = lim
௬→௬ೖ
ೕ
డ௕(௬)
డ௬
, 𝑗 ∈{+,-}. 𝜏 is the weighted average of 
marginal effects across the population. The weight is the relative likelihood that an individual 
has 𝑌௜ = 𝑦௞, given 𝜀௜ (see Card et al., 2012, pp. 8–9, for a more detailed discussion). 
 
The numerator in equation (2) is estimated semi-parametrically as 𝛽ଵ using the following local 
power series expansion: 
 
𝐸(𝑆௜|𝑌௜ = 𝑦) ≈ 𝛼଴ + ෍[𝛼௣(𝑦 − 𝑦௞)௣ + 𝛽௣𝐷௜(𝑦 − 𝑦௞)௣]
௉
௣ୀଵ
, (3) 
where P is the chosen polynomial order of the estimated function and 𝐷௜ is the treatment status, 
where 1 means treated and 0 means not treated (𝐷௜(𝑧) = 1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑧 > 0, 𝐷௜(𝑧) =  0 otherwise). The 
power series is a local approximation of 𝑚(𝑦). Note that |𝑦 − 𝑦௞| ≤ ℎ, where h is the bandwidth 
chosen for the estimation. The denominator in equation (2) is the change of the slope of the 
deterministic policy rule 𝑏(𝑦) at the kink point. 
 
3.3. Fuzzy setting 
 
In applications, one rarely encounters deterministic policy rules in observed variables. Card et al. 
(2012, pp. 10–12) distinguish between sharp and fuzzy RKD. A fuzzy design arises when there is a 
significant difference between the theoretical and observed value of the kink in the policy rule. The 
difference stems from, e.g., measurement errors or the fact that the kink in the policy rule is affected 
by some unobserved and observed variables in addition to the primary assignment variable. In our 
setting, a likely source of error is the manner in which variables are defined and classified in the 
original dataset (see Section 4 and Böckerman et al., 2018, Figure A3). In a fuzzy setting, the 
instrumental variable method is used, analogously to a fuzzy RDD setting. 
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In a fuzzy RKD, 𝐵௜ = 𝑏(𝑌௜, 𝜀௜஻). Thus, 𝐵௜ is now determined by unobserved factors, 𝜀௜஻,  that might 
be correlated with the assignment variable. Additional assumptions are also required for 
identification. Along with some technical assumptions, monotonicity in the assignment function 
must hold (Condition 3). This condition states that the direction of the kink is either non-negative or 
non-positive for the entire population. 𝐵௜ and 𝑌௜ are allowed to have specific types of measurement 
error.  
 
When Conditions 1, 2 and 3 and the necessary technical conditions hold,  
 
 
𝜏 =
𝐷ା𝑚(𝑦௞) −  𝐷ି𝑚(𝑦௞)
𝐷ା𝑏(𝑦௞) −  𝐷ି𝑏(𝑦௞)
, 
 
(4) 
 
where 𝐷௝𝑚(𝑦௞) = lim
௬→௬ೖ
ೕ
డ௠(௬)
డ௬
, 𝐷௝𝑏(𝑦௞) = lim
௬→௬ೖ
ೕ
డா[஻೔|௒೔ୀ௬]
డ௬
, 𝑗 ∈{+,-}.𝜏, the average marginal effect 
of 𝑏(𝑦) at 𝑦 = 𝑦௞ in equation (4), is weighted by the product of three components (see Card et al., 
2012, p. 12). As in a sharp RKD, the first component is the relative likelihood of 𝑌௜ = 𝑦௞. The 
second is the size of the kink in the benefit rule for individual i. The third component is the 
probability that the assignment variable is correctly measured at 𝑌௜ = 𝑦௞. 
 
For estimation of the expected change of the policy rule, we use the following local power series 
expansion:  
 
𝐸(𝐵௜|𝑌௜ = 𝑦) ≈ 𝛿଴ + ෍[𝛿௣(𝑦 − 𝑦௞)௣ + 𝛾௣𝐷௜(𝑦 − 𝑦௞)௣]
௉
௣ୀଵ
, 
 
 
where γଵ is the empirical counterpart of the policy rule. The elasticity of interest can be 
approximated as 𝜏 ≈ ఉభ
ఊభ
. To obtain the correct point estimate and standard errors for τ, we use 
instrumental variable (IV) regression, following Card et al. (2012, pp. 20–21). The instrument is the 
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interaction term of past earnings, 𝑦, and an indicator of earnings above the lower kink point, 
𝐷௜(𝑦 − 𝑦௞). The instrumented variable is 𝐵௜, the received compensation. 
 
3.4. Bandwidth selector 
 
The bandwidth selection is a trade-off between bias and precision. Card et al. (2012, pp. 32–33) use 
the “rule-of-thumb” bandwidth selector of Fan and Gijbels (1996, equation 3.20, p. 67; henceforth, 
FG): 
ℎ = 𝐶௣ ቊ
𝜎ොଶ(0)
[𝑚ෝ (௣ାଵ)(0)]ଶ𝑓መ(0)
ቋ
ଵ
ଶ௣ାଷ
𝑛ି
ଵ
ଶ௣ାଷ, 
 
where p is the order of the polynomial in the main specification; 𝜎ොଶ(0) and 𝑚ෝ (௣ାଵ)(0) are, 
respectively, the estimated error variance and the (p+1)th order derivative of the regression, using a 
wide-bandwidth polynomial regression of equation (3)3; C1 is 2.352 for the boundary case with a 
uniform kernel; and 𝑓መ(0) is estimated from a global polynomial fit to the histogram of earnings.  
 
Bandwidth choices that are too “large” lead to a non-negligible bias in the estimator of the 
conditional expectation function. We report the results for multiple bandwidths in the sensitivity 
analysis and we also use a bandwidth selector proposed by Calonico et al. (2014; henceforth, CCT). 
Calonico et al. (2014) build the CCT bandwidth selector upon the FG bandwidth selector. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 We use the data for a very wide window of 0.8 log earnings for this regression, which contains 
85% of the total sample. This is done in order to keep the polynomial order within reasonable 
limits. The polynomial order is chosen to minimize the Akaike Information Criterion. 
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4. DATA 
 
We use total data on Finnish sickness absence spells over the period 2004–2012. These 
comprehensive register-based data originate from KELA and are derived from the database that is 
used to pay out the SA compensations. Therefore, some measurement error might arise from the 
aggregation of variables when converting the original register for research purposes. In particular, 
consecutive absence spells that start within 300 days are counted as a single spell if the diagnosis 
remains the same. Only 0.06% of the spells reach the length of 300 days.  
 
Earnings originate from the comprehensive official tax registers that have been validated by the 
Finnish tax authorities. The amount of measurement error in earnings should be minimal compared 
to survey-based measures. However, even the most accurate and comprehensive sources of earnings 
can contain some amount of measurement error. 
 
The administrative data cover both wage and salary earners and self-employed persons. The data 
record the start and end dates for all sickness spells and the total amount of SA paid for each person. 
Annual earnings are deflated to 2012 prices by using the consumer price index. 
 
The data consist of absence spells that last longer than the waiting period of nine full working days. 
The distribution is right-skewed.4 Thus, longer sickness absences contribute disproportionately to 
the total days lost and absence costs. The data allow us to concentrate on those absences on which 
the sickness insurance system payouts are based.  
 
                                                 
4 The skewness of the distribution is 2.5 and 2.9 for the total sample and for the window of 0.0796 
log earnings around the lower kink point, respectively. 
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The data record a person’s past taxable earnings, which KELA obtains directly from the Finnish tax 
authorities. KELA uses the same information to calculate the SA for beneficiaries. The data also 
include useful background information such as a medical diagnosis for sick leave. Diagnoses are 
important covariates in our setting, because they can be used to test the smoothness condition, 
which is a critical assumption for the identification of the causal effect using RKD. The initial 
diagnosis of individuals is documented according to the International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD-10), which is the standard diagnostic tool for clinical purposes. We have also linked to the 
data the highest completed education from the Register of Completed Education and Degrees, 
maintained by Statistics Finland. 
 
The estimations are restricted to those in the labor force who are eligible for sick pay and who are 
between 16 and 70 years of age. The final sample used in the analysis includes compensated 
absence spells that are above zero in duration and whose payment criteria and initial diagnoses are 
known for employees with a single employer during their sickness spell.5 The final sample around 
the lower kink point consists of 37,000–41,000 individuals, depending on the year.  
 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1 (duration of sickness absence and background 
characteristics for persons; see also Böckerman et al., 2018, Figure A4). A fraction of the insured 
(13.6%) are compensated according to an eligibility criterion other than prior earnings (e.g., if 
earnings have changed by more than 20%, the compensation can be claimed based on more recent 
                                                 
5 A part-time sickness benefit was introduced in Finland at the beginning of 2007. We exclude its 
recipients from the sample. Only 0.5% of the sample has no known diagnosis. Also, 146 
observations with missing compensation data were excluded. We are able to identify entrepreneurs 
from 2006 onwards. We exclude the 2.3% of the original sample that entrepreneurs represent. In 
total, we exclude 3.0% of the original data to construct the final sample. 
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earnings; see Toivonen, 2012). The results are robust to their exclusion from the sample (see 
Böckerman et al., 2018, Table A2, column 3). 
 
Table 1 here 
 
We exploit both kink points to identify and estimate the effect of the policy. However, we focus on 
the lower kink point for two reasons. First, the lower kink point is located close to the median 
earnings, containing substantial mass to support the estimation of statistically significant effects 
(Böckerman et al., 2018, Figures A1–A2 and Table A1). The large sample size around this kink 
point shows up as smaller variability in the length of sickness absence within the 800 euro bins. 
Second, there is a large change in the replacement rate at the lower kink point (cf. Figure 2). 
 
5. RESULTS 
 
5.1. Baseline estimates 
 
Unless otherwise stated, the results are based on a log-log specification, since the estimates can be 
interpreted directly as elasticities without a cumbersome conversion. Figure 3 illustrates the 
duration of sickness absence and annual earnings around the lower kink point.6 It suggests that there 
is a significant behavioral response at the kink. 
                                                 
6 The bandwidth of the bins in Figure 3 was chosen for illustrative purposes to mitigate excessive 
noise, following the methodological guidance of Lee and Lemieux (2010). The number of bins used 
coincides with the number given by Sturges’ rule (Sturges, 1926), which is a classic method for 
choosing the optimal number of bins for histograms. The two bins directly above the kink appear to 
show a discontinuity in the conditional mean. However, adding a dummy to the main specification 
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Using the FG bandwidth of 0.0796 log euro for annual earnings, we find clear evidence for the 
incentive effects (Table 2 and Böckerman et al., 2018, Table A3). The estimation window in the 
main specification includes 12% of the sample, centered at the median. The result is robust to using 
levels or logs of the explanatory and dependent variables (Böckerman et al., 2018, Table A3).  
 
Figure 3 and Table 2 here 
 
We first assess how observed benefits change at the lower kink point in the benefits-earnings 
schedule (the first stage in the fuzzy RKD analysis). Above the kink point, daily benefits increase 
by about one-third of a euro less when daily earnings increase by one euro, compared to below the 
kink point (point estimates vary from -0.394 to -0.318). These numbers are slightly higher than the 
strict policy rule of -0.3 (cf. Section 3.3). Using the linear specification, the estimated change of the 
slope of behavior, the second stage, at the lower kink point is -0.556. The weighted average of the 
marginal elasticities of the duration of sickness absence, 𝜏, with respect to the replacement rate is 
1.41 (95% CI: [0.36, 2.46], Table 2). The point estimate implies a high elasticity.  
 
The quadratic specification (𝑝 = 2 in equation 3) gives a point estimate of 0.83 [0.27, 1.38], with 
the FG bandwidth of 0.2953 also implying a significant behavioral response. Using the CCT 
(Calonico et al., 2014) bias-corrected estimator and bandwidth (0.1416), we estimate the elasticity 
                                                 
(3) shows that the discontinuity is not statistically significant. Also, the point estimate for 𝛽ଵ in 
Table 2 (column 1) changes only from 0.556 to 0.579. See Böckerman et al. (2018), Figure A5 for 
the same graph without the fit and confidence interval but illustrating the sample size around the 
kink point. Figures A6–A7 in Böckerman et al. (2018) report the annual graphs. 
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to be 1.16. The CCT was estimated using the triangular kernel.7 The robustness of the result using 
the CCT estimator is reassuring, since some results have previously been sensitive to the choice of 
method (e.g., Card et al., 2015a–2015b). 
 
The wider the bandwidth used, the lower the point estimates get. This result is illustrated in Figure 
4. If the functions 𝐸(𝑆௜|𝑌௜ = 𝑦) and 𝐸(𝐵௜|𝑌௜ = 𝑦) are piecewise linear and the sample size is 
sufficiently large, then the point estimate would remain unchanged with all bandwidths, i.e. the 
relationship depicted in Figure 4 would be a horizontal line. Thus, deviations from the horizontal 
line are indicative of curvature in the conditional expectation functions and consequent bias in the 
local linear estimator. 
 
Figure 4 here 
 
The choice of bandwidth is a compromise between precision and bias. The main specification uses 
the FG bandwidth h, estimated to be 0.0796 log euro, which fulfills two criteria. First, covariates are 
linear, whereas they show nonlinearity at wider bandwidths (Böckerman et al., 2018, Appendix 2) 
than 0.0796 log euro. Second, the estimates are sufficiently precise, whereas a narrower band would 
increase estimated standard errors. Precision increases with sample size and variance in the 
                                                 
7 The FG bandwidth depends on the polynomial order. Under the same bandwidth sequence, the 
variance of the local quadratic estimator with a uniform kernel is 16 times as large as its local linear 
counterpart (see Card et al., 2012, pp. 15–16). Thus, we focus mainly on the linear specification. 
Asymptotically a local quadratic regression using its optimal bandwidth sequence is preferred to the 
local linear regression with its optimal bandwidth sequence. The asymptotic advantage, however, 
does not provide finite sample guarantees. Following the recommendation of Gelman and Imbens 
(2014) for RDD, we do not report results with higher-order polynomials. 
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explanatory variable, both of which decrease as the bandwidth narrows. Note that the FG bandwidth 
we use in the main specification is quite narrow in terms of monthly earnings (~460 euro in 2012). 
 
5.2. Sensitivity analyses 
 
Ganong and Jäger (2017) propose that researchers using RKD should present a distribution of 
placebo estimates in regions without a policy kink. We run 101 placebo regressions (Böckerman et 
al., 2018, Figure A8) to test the robustness of the main specification in Table 2. We use the same 
FG bandwidth (of the true lower kink point) for all these regressions. Of the 94 regressions not 
around the true kink point, 7 (~7.4%) show a significant estimated effect. This lends strong support 
to the claim that the result is not spurious.  
 
We confirm the result from the main specification using different sets of controls (Böckerman et al., 
2018, Table A4). The results show a reassuring degree of robustness. Controlling for individual 
characteristics and the initial diagnosis at the one-letter level (21 different values) gives the same 
point estimate as the regression with no controls. The adjusted R2 of the model increases from 
0.0003 to 0.0781 once all the controls are included, since diagnoses are important determinants per 
se of the duration of sickness absence spells. The diagnoses also correlate with earnings. The 
composition of the population is important in one respect, the use of controls eliminates the positive 
slope below the lower kink point. Demographic characteristics explain the slope. 
 
We also run the estimates by subsample to study the robustness of the effect. When left truncated by 
sickness spell length (Böckerman et al., 2018, Figure A9), the point estimate increases until a left 
truncation of 20 days, after which there is a general decreasing tendency. Right truncation of longer 
spells also decreases the point estimates (see Böckerman et al., 2018, Figure A10 and Figures A11–
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A12 for the estimate for right and left truncation at 240 days). The baseline result thus requires the 
use of the non-truncated sample. 
 
We also show the results for subsamples according to sex, by the SA criterion and keeping only 
observations where the data year matches the starting year of sickness (Böckerman et al., 2018, 
Table A2). When subsampled by diagnosis, the sample sizes drop dramatically and all relevant 
estimates are insignificant (not reported). The point estimate is larger for men. Using administrative 
data from a universal mandatory sickness insurance system that very closely resembles the Finnish 
setting, Johansson and Palme (2005), consistent with our result, also report a larger behavioral 
response for men. The heterogeneity of behavior by sex or other attributes, however, is of no 
practical interest unless the policy parameters (i.e. the benefit and contribution rules) are 
conditioned on these variables. 
 
To implement RKD, it is crucial to check for the smoothness conditions of covariates at the kink 
point (see Corollary 2 in Card et al., 2015b, p. 2469). Following Card et al. (2012), we study the 
smoothness of a covariate index, namely, the predicted values of a regression of sickness duration 
on a set of 31 covariates (sex, age, age squared, living in the Helsinki region, higher education, 
year, diagnosis at the one-letter level). We find that there is no statistically significant kink at the 
kink point (see Böckerman et al., 2018, Figure A13 and Table A5; we examine the covariates 
individually in Böckerman et al., 2018, Appendix 2). 
 
Smoothness in the density around the kink is a key testable identification assumption in a valid 
RKD. We test and find no evidence of non-smoothness in the density function of log earnings 
around the lower kink point (Böckerman et al., 2018, Figures A14–A15). 
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The estimated effects are insignificant at the upper kink point (Böckerman et al., 2018, Table A6). 
There are at least two reasons for the insignificance of the estimate: fewer data points and a smaller 
slope change.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Using administrative data on sickness absence spells with a large sample size, we find a 
considerable incentive effect of the benefit rule at the intensive margin in a local quasi-experimental 
research setting. The point estimate of the elasticity of the duration of sickness absence with respect 
to the replacement rate is on the order of one and is lower in samples which exclude long spells.  
 
Our estimate of the elasticity is at the high end of estimates obtained in the literature using reforms, 
which are usually targeted at a specific subset of the population (see Ziebarth & Karlsson, 2014, pp. 
209–210). The effect in a subset of the population might differ from that of the total population. 
Compared to these difference-in-difference studies, our estimates are based on a different set of 
assumptions. We evaluate the validity of the setting thoroughly. 
 
The research design builds on exogenous variation, which can be exploited for coherent causal 
inference. The result is robust even with multiple controls, including sickness diagnoses. 
Exogeneity is ensured by the fact that the sickness benefit is determined by earnings two years 
prior. Thus, our research provides a clean application of the regression kink design. An extensive 
battery of checks was run on a number of variables which might influence our results at the kink 
point. Since the estimates are obtained around the earnings level close to the median earnings of 
full-time workers (within 1% in all years), the response is likely to be similar for a large proportion 
of the population. 
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We deliver a compelling estimate with strong internal validity on a vital policy parameter in a social 
insurance system. The result we find is useful for policy makers who aim to improve the mandatory 
sickness insurance. Future research should study the response at the extensive margin. 
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FIGURE 1 Relationship between prior annual earnings and daily sickness allowance, 2012. 
 
Notes: The vertical dashed lines represent the discontinuity point at 1325 euro and the lower and upper kink points at 
34,496 and 53,072 euro, respectively, in 2012. 
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FIGURE 2 Replacement rates, 2012. 
 
Notes: The vertical dashed lines represent the lower and upper kink points at 34,496 and 53,072 euro, respectively, in 
2012. The horizontal line represents the lowest marginal replacement rate of 0.25. 
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TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics. 
 
 
Panel A: Total sample Panel B: Sample around 
the lower kink point 
Panel C: Sample around 
the upper kink point 
 
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Duration of sickness 
absence (days) 
43.76 70.73 1 575 36.36 60.94 1 454 35.22 58.68 1 458 
Duration of sickness 
absence (log-days) 
2.76 1.47 0 6 2.62 1.42 0 6.12 2.63 1.39 0 6 
Earnings 26365 16120 0 6120738 33120 1924 29095 37897 50759 3073 44497 58652 
Log earnings 10.07 0.67 -3.00 15.63 10.41 0.06 10.28 10.54 10.83 0.06 10.70 10.98 
Age 45.13 11.35 16 70 46.53 10.01 17 69 48.4 8.95 19 68 
Female 0.59 0.49 0 1 0.48 0.5 0 1 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Tertiary level education  0.14 0.34 0 1 0.16 0.36 0 1 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Helsinki Metropolitan Area 0.17 0.37 0 1 0.19 0.39 0 1 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Sickness allowance per day 
(euro) 
54.3 23.19 0.01 4600.56 69.16 8.26 0.02 136.21 90.5 10.77 0 171 
Panel C: Sample size by year 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Total sample 344,590 352,446 346,747 341,527 339,949 317,618 309,893 309,333 313,101 2,975,204 
Sample 
around the 
lower kink 
point 
39,887 41,275 41,380 40,617 40,693 38,368 37,875 37,068 37,652 354,815 
Sample 
around the 
upper kink 
point 
11,480 11,903 12,102 10,923 12,061 11,446 11,533 10,661 10,914 103,023 
 
Notes: The sample around the lower kink point is defined within the FG bandwidth (0.0796 log euro of annual earnings). 
The diagnoses M, S and F respectively represent 34, 13 and 16 percent of the whole sample and 36, 14 and 14 percent of 
the sample around the lower kink point. Diagnosis M in ICD-10 refers to diseases of the musculoskeletal system and 
connective tissue. Diagnosis S refers to injury, poisoning and certain other consequences of external causes. Diagnosis 
F refers to mental and behavioral disorders.  
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FIGURE 3 Duration of sickness absence (2004–2012) and annual earnings (two years prior) 
around the lower kink point. 
 
 
 
Notes: Annual earnings are deflated to 2012 prices by using the consumer price index. Earnings are in logs and are 
normalized to zero at the lower kink point. The dots represent the mean duration of sickness absence in bins of 0.018 log 
euro. The regression fit and 95% confidence interval are shown for the FG bandwidth (0.0796 log euro of annual 
earnings), which is the main specification bandwidth used in the analysis (cf. Table 2). 
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TABLE 2 Regression kink design estimates. 
 
 Panel A: Dependent variable: log duration of sickness absence (days) 
 Linear specification 
 
Quadratic 
specification 
 
Linear specification, 
bias-corrected (CCT) 
Bandwidth FG bandwidth FG bandwidth CCT Bandwidth 
Kernel Uniform Uniform Triangular 
Change of slope at kink 
point (𝛽ଵ) 
-0.556*** 
(0.208) 
-0.353*** 
(0.119) 
.. 
Slope below kink point 
(𝛼ଵ) 
0.240** 
(0.112) 
0.162*** 
(0.06) 
.. 
Yearly fixed effects Y Y N 
Polynomial order 1 2 1 (bias correction: 2) 
𝑅ଶ (Adj.) 0.0003 0.0002 .. 
N 354,800 1,326,992 635,548 
 Panel B: Elasticity of the duration of sickness absence with respect to 
replacement rate 
Change in the replacement 
rate (𝛾ଵ)  
-0.394*** 
(0.021) 
-0.318*** 
(0.086) 
-0.393*** 
(0.012) 
Elasticity (𝜏 ≈ ఉభ
ఊభ
) 1.411 
 
0.830 .. 
 Panel C: Instrumental variable estimation of the elasticity of the 
duration of sickness absence with respect to replacement rate 
Estimated elasticity (𝜏) 1.411*** 
(0.536)  
0.830*** 
(0.283) 
1.155***  
(0.359) 
N 354,800 1,326,992 566,392 
 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p<0.1; ** 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The main specification is marked in light grey. The estimated model is equation (3). The FG 
bandwidth, referring to the “rule-of-thumb” bandwidth described in Fan and Gijbels (1996), is estimated to be 0.0796 
and 0.2953 for the linear and quadratic specifications, respectively. The 95% confidence interval for the IV estimated 
elasticity with a point estimate of 1.41 is [0.36, 2.46] using the linear specification. CCT refers to the bandwidth (0.1416) 
and bias-corrected estimator proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). The 95% confidence interval for the IV estimated 
elasticity with a point estimate of 1.16 is [0.45, 1.86] using the linear CCT specification. The instrument is the interaction 
term of past earnings and an indicator of earnings above the lower kink point. The Angrist–Pischke first-stage F-statistic 
(see Angrist & Pischke, 2009, pp. 217–218) for a test of the hypothesis that the coefficient of the instrument is zero in a 
regression of the received compensation on the instrument is higher (346) in the linear FG specification than the 
conventional threshold of 10 for a weak instrument. Clustering standard errors at the level of the individual increases the 
95% CI only marginally (1.67%). In the main specification, the standard error with clustering is 0.545. 
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FIGURE 4 Regression kink design estimates with different bandwidths. 
 
Notes: The graph represents 33 estimates of the elasticity (τ) using the main specification (log sickness absence duration 
on log earnings with yearly fixed effects) between bandwidths of 0.0396 and 0.1996 at intervals of 0.05 log earnings. The 
narrowest and widest bandwidths go far beyond optimal levels and are only depicted for illustrative purposes. The point 
estimates are depicted in black and the 95% confidence intervals in light gray. The FG bandwidth is marked by a short 
vertical line (cf. notes to Table 2). 
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